It was a failed coup attempt. The Oakwood incident wasn’t merely a demonstration of military grievances over administrative, internal matters. It was a grab for power.

The rebel leaders said so on the morning of the Oakwood takeover. They demanded a change in the political leadership. They had an alternative program of government, the so-called National Recovery Program of Senator Gringo Honasan, which they wanted to impose.

Another evidence of the political component of the rebellion was the feeble attempt to simulate an Edsa-type civilian-military uprising. Early in the morning, a group of civilian marchers, armed with banners touting the National Recovery Program, attempted to march near Oakwood to support the rebels. The civilian marchers were prepared and had obvious foreknowledge of the Oakwood takeover.

Whoever plotted the failed coup took from the playbook of the Edsa People Power revolt that deposed former President Marcos. At that time, a military breakaway group, led by former Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Philippine Constabulary General Fidel Ramos, broke from the chain of command, renounced their allegiance to the Marcos dictatorship, and holed up in Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. Civilians or “people power” surrounded the rebels in support.

The Oakwood plotters had the 1986 People Power revolt in mind but grossly overestimated their ability to rouse popular support. It didn’t help the plotters’ cause that they were mouthing motherhood slogans that left people clueless as to what they were really fighting for. Even after their extended exposure on television, the rebels failed to inform the public what the components of their national recovery program are.

What made the rebels yield?

I don’t believe for a moment that the pleas of their “mistahs” or PMA classmates changed the rebels’ minds. Instead, to my mind, the following forced the leaders to reconsider:

First, civilians didn’t mass near Oakwood to support them as they had hoped. There wasn’t even a sprinkling of the masa crowd similar to Edsa 2.

The failure of civilians to rally for them wasn’t simply the result of the police stopping marching supporters. It was that their plan was poorly conceived and executed. While the public probably saw merit in their cause of graft and corruption against the military establishment, it wasn’t enough to prompt ordinary citizens to rush to Oakwood and express political support.

Second, mass defections from other military units didn’t occur. Their covert supporters in the military sat on the fence, rather than defected. When the civilian component of the rebellion failed to occur, other units chose prudently to stay on the sidelines.

Last, the governments of the United States, Australia, and Singapore expressed unequivocal support for the Arroyo administration. It’s worth noting that soon after US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone went on television reading a statement of support for the Arroyo government at about 3 p.m. Sunday, the first surrenders took place.

It doesn’t mean that Ricciardone’s statement was enough to scare the rebels. It was just the last nail in the coffin, after their scenario of civilian support and more military defections didn’t play out. The rebels had meant to present the US with a fait accompli but they never got around to that.

However, the Arroyo administration shouldn’t be strutting around, proclaiming its victory over the rebels. First, there was a massive failure of intelligence. Everybody knew that a coup plot was afoot. The newspapers had started reporting it a week earlier. I myself was told two weeks before that naval officers were plotting a coup.

The fact is that the government’s “intelligence” officials (would that be an oxymoron?) failed to surveille the rebel officers, whom they knew all along. It’s simply amazing that a band of disgruntled officers could meet in staging houses in Mandaluyong and Dasmarinas Village without the government detecting and stopping them.

Second, the Arroyo government and its civil society supporters failed to generate enthusiastic public support against the coup either. Civil society called for massive vigils and demonstrations in front of the Edsa Shrine as early as Saturday when rumors of the coup mounted. But only scant hundreds showed up. It wasn’t enough to convince the rebel leaders that their power grab was doomed from the start.

Third, the rebellion showed the hollowness of the strong republic. The military, “strong arm” of the strong republic, was exposed as riddled with graft and corruption and dissension. With the escape of self-confessed bomber Al Ghouzi and now, Sunday’s rebellion, the government’s claims of improving peace and order have suffered a setback. The Arroyo government’s credibility with investors has clearly suffered.

Giddy at the success in quashing the rebellion, President Arroyo is papering over the structural problems that gave rise to the rebellion and encouraging talk of her running in 2004. Except for setting up commissions to investigate the rebels’ grievances, there are few initiatives to address the root causes of the country’s malaise, from a weak, politicized, and corrupt bureaucracy to weak finances. On Constitutional change, the President has chosen to fence sit, instead encouraging her sycophants’ call for another six-year term, which effectively means she’s for the status quo.

Instead of seeing the tactical victory over the Oakwood rebellion as a sign of her omnipotence, President Arroyo should see it as a shot across the bow. She can’t hope to renege on her promise not to run and then be able to preside over a stable nation for six more years.

Nobody came out of the Oakwood misadventure smelling like roses - not the idealistic but misguided young officers, not civil society, not Secretary Angel Reyes, and not President Arroyo.